"Money Manager Capitalism and the Global Financial Crisis" by L. Randall Wray
Working Paper No. 578
Money Manager Capitalism and the Global Financial Crisis
by
L. Randall Wray
University of Missouri–Kansas City
and The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
September 2009
The Levy Economics Institute Working Paper Collection presents research in progress by
Levy Institute scholars and conference participants. The purpose of the series is to
disseminate ideas to and elicit comments from academics and professionals.
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, founded in 1986, is a nonprofit,
nonpartisan, independently funded research organization devoted to public service.
Through scholarship and economic research it generates viable, effective public policy
responses to important economic problems that profoundly affect the quality of life in
the United States and abroad.




Copyright © The Levy Economics Institute 2009 All rights reserved.  2
ABSTRACT 
This paper applies Hyman Minsky’s approach to provide an analysis of the causes of the 
global financial crisis. Rather than finding the origins in recent developments, this paper 
links the crisis to the long-term transformation of the economy from a robust financial 
structure in the 1950s to the fragile one that existed at the beginning of this crisis in 2007. 
As Minsky said, “Stability is destabilizing”: the relative stability of the economy in the 
early postwar period encouraged this transformation of the economy. Today’s crisis is 
rooted in what he called “money manager capitalism,” the current stage of capitalism 
dominated by highly leveraged funds seeking maximum returns in an environment that 
systematically under-prices risk. With little regulation or supervision of financial 
institutions, money managers have concocted increasingly esoteric instruments that 
quickly spread around the world. Those playing along are rewarded with high returns 
because highly leveraged funding drives up prices for the underlying assets. Since each 
subsequent bust wipes out only a portion of the managed money, a new boom inevitably 
rises. Perhaps this will prove to be the end of this stage of capitalism—the money 
manager phase. Of course, it is too early even to speculate on the form capitalism will 
take. I will only briefly outline some policy implications. 
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At the beginning of 2009, the world faces the worst economic crisis since the 1930s. 
Even mainstream economists have begun to talk about the possibility of a depression. 
References to Keynesian theory and policy are now commonplace, with only truly 
committed free marketeers arguing against massive government spending to cushion the 
collapse and reregulation to prevent future crises. The final months of 2008 saw huge job 
losses in the U.S. and elsewhere, and few believe that recovery will begin soon even with 
President Obama’s fiscal stimulus package. All sorts of explanations have been proffered 
for the causes of the crisis: lax regulation and oversight, rising inequality that encouraged 
households to borrow to support spending, greed and irrational exuberance, and excessive 
global liquidity—spurred by easy money policy in the U.S. and by U.S. current account 
deficits that flooded the world with too many dollars.  
Hyman Minsky’s work has enjoyed unprecedented interest, with many calling this 
the “Minsky Moment” or “Minsky Crisis” (Cassidy 2008, Chancellor 2007, McCulley 
2007, Whalen 2007). In this paper I will not be able to address all rival explanations of 
the cause of the crisis. What I will do instead is to provide a sharper “Minskyan” analysis 
than the superficial explanations that many others have offered. We should not view this 
as a “moment” that can be traced to recent developments. Rather, as Minsky had been 
arguing for nearly fifty years, what we have seen is a slow transformation of the financial 
system toward fragility. In the final years before his death in 1996, he had developed a 
“stages” approach to this evolution, identifying the current phase as “money manager 
capitalism.” This paper will focus on the role that money managers played in creating this 
crisis. It is essential to recognize that we have had a long series of crises, and the trend 
has been toward more severe and more frequent crises: REITs in the early 1970s; LDC 
debt in the early 1980s; commercial real estate, junk bonds, and the thrift crisis in the US 
(with banking crises in many other nations) in the 1980s; stock market crashes in 1987 
and again in 2000 with the Dot-com bust; the Japanese meltdown from the early 1980s; 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on an update of “Financial Markets Meltdown: What Can We Learn from Minsky,” 
and “The Commodities Market Bubble: Money Manager Capitalism and the Financialization of  
Commodities,” both published by The Levy Economics Institute and available at www.levy.org. 
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LTCM, the Russian default, and Asian debt crises in the late 1990s; and so on. Until the 
current crisis, each of these was resolved (some more painfully than others; one could 
argue that Japan never successfully resolved its crisis) with some combination of central 
bank or international institution (IMF, World Bank) intervention plus a fiscal rescue 
(often taking the form of U.S. Treasury spending of last resort to prop up the U.S. 
economy to maintain imports). 
Minsky always insisted that there are two essential propositions of his “financial 
instability hypothesis” (See Papadimitriou and Wray 1998 for a summary of Minsky’s 
approach.). The first is that there are two financing “regimes”—one that is consistent 
with stability and the other in which the economy is subject to instability. The second 
proposition is that “stability is destabilizing,” so that endogenous processes will tend to 
move a stable system toward fragility. While Minsky is best-known for his analysis of the 
crisis, he argued that the strongest force in a modern capitalist economy operates in the 
other direction—toward an unconstrained speculative boom. The current crisis is a 
natural outcome of these processes—an unsustainable explosion of real estate prices, 
mortgage debt and leveraged positions in collateralized securities in conjunction with a 
similarly unsustainable explosion of commodities prices. Unlike some popular 
explanations of the causes of the meltdown, Minsky would not blame “irrational 
exuberance” or “manias” or “bubbles.” Those who had been caught up in the boom 
behaved “rationally” at least according to the “model of the model” they had developed 
to guide their behavior.  
Following Hyman Minsky, I blame money manager capitalism—the economic 
system characterized by highly leveraged funds seeking maximum returns in an 
environment that systematically under-prices risk. With little regulation or supervision of 
financial institutions, money managers have concocted increasingly esoteric instruments 
that quickly spread around the world. Contrary to economic theory, markets generate 
perverse incentives for excess risk, punishing the timid. Those playing along are 
rewarded with high returns because highly leveraged funding drives up prices for the 
underlying assets—whether they are dot-com stocks, Las Vegas homes, or corn futures. 
Since each subsequent bust only wipes out a portion of the managed money, a new boom 
inevitably rises. However, this current crisis is probably so severe that it will not only   5
destroy a considerable part of the managed money, but it has already thoroughly 
discredited the money managers. Right now, it seems unlikely that “business as usual” 
will return. Perhaps this will prove to be the end of this stage of capitalism—the money 
manager phase. Of course, it is too early to even speculate on the form capitalism will 
take. I will only briefly outline some policy implications. 
  
THE DEMISE OF BANKING AND THE RISE OF MONEY MANAGERS 
 
In the developed world there has been a long-term transition away from relatively tightly 
regulated banking toward “market-based” financial institutions. This transformation is 
most clear in the U.S., which had separated commercial banking (loans and deposits) 
from investment banking (broader array of financial instruments including equities and 
securities). Two decades ago there was a lot of discussion of the benefits of the “universal 
banking” model adopted abroad (Germany, Japan), and there was some movement in the 
U.S. in that direction. However, of far greater importance was the development of the 
“originate to distribute” model best represented by securitization, and use of “off-balance 
sheet” operations. Ironically, the push to increase safety and soundness through creation 
of international standards as adopted in the Basle agreements actually encouraged these 
developments—which as we now know greatly increased systemic risk. Here I will focus 
on developments in the U.S., although to a lesser degree there was a similar 
transformation in other developed nations. This is not at all surprising given the 
importance of the U.S. in the world economy and given that similar ideas were guiding 
policy makers and financial institution management around the world. 
Modern securitization of home mortgages began in the early 1980s. While 
securitization is usually presented as a technological innovation that came out of private 
sector initiative to spread risk, in reality—as Minsky (1987) argued—it was a response to 
policy initiated by Chairman Volcker in 1979 (See also Kuttner 2007). This was the 
infamous experiment in monetarism, during which the Fed purportedly targeted money 
growth to fight inflation—pushing the fed funds rate above 20% (Wray 1994). In the new 
policy regime, no financial institution could afford to be stuck with long-term fixed rate 
mortgages. Hence, regulators and supervisors “freed” regulated banks and thrifts to   6
pursue higher return, and riskier, activities. There is no need to recount the sordid details 
of that fiasco (Wray 1994; Black 2005). However, the long-term consequence was the 
recognition that the mortgage “market” had to change—with banks and thrifts shifting 
assets off their books through securitization.  
Minsky (1987) was one of the few commentators who understood the true 
potential of securitization. In principle, all mortgages (indeed, most bank assets) could be 
packaged into a variety of risk classes, with differential pricing to cover risk. Investors 
could choose the desired risk-return trade-off. Financial institutions would earn fee 
income for loan origination, for assessing risk, and for servicing the mortgages. Wall 
Street would place the collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), slicing and dicing to suit 
the needs of investors. Securitization contributed to an apparent democratization of 
access to credit as homeownership rates rose to record levels over the coming decades—
and it initially appeared that banks and thrifts were insulated from interest rate risk.   
Minsky (1987) argued that securitization reflected two additional developments. 
First, it was part and parcel of the globalization of finance, as securitization creates assets 
freed from national boundaries. As Minsky was fond of pointing out, the unparalleled 
post-WWII depression-free expansion in the developed world (and even in much of the 
developing world) has created a global pool of managed money seeking returns. 
Packaged securities were appealing for global investors trying to achieve the desired 
proportion of dollar-denominated assets. It would be no surprise to Minsky to find that 
the value of securitized American mortgages eventually exceeded the value of the global 
market for federal government debt.  
The second development is the relative decline of the importance of banks in 
favor of “markets.” (The bank share of all financial assets fell from around 50% in the 
1950s to around 25% in the 1990s.) This was encouraged by the experiment in 
Monetarism (that decimated the regulated portion of the sector in favor of the relatively 
unregulated “markets”), but it was also by continual erosion of the portion of the 
financial sphere that had been allocated by rules, regulations, and tradition to banks. The 
growth of competition on both sides of banking business—checkable deposits at non-
bank financial institutions that could pay market interest rates; and rise of the commercial 
paper market that allowed firms to bypass commercial banks—squeezed the profitability   7
of banking. Minsky (1987) observed that banks appear to require a spread of about 450 
basis points between interest rates earned on assets less that paid on liabilities. This 
covers the normal rate of return on capital, plus the required reserve “tax” imposed on 
banks (reserves are non-earning assets), and the costs of servicing customers. By contrast, 
financial markets can operate with much lower spreads precisely because they are exempt 
from required reserve ratios, regulated capital requirements, and much of the costs of 
relationship banking.  
To restore profitability in the aftermath of Monetarism, banks and thrifts would 
earn fee income for loan origination, but by moving the mortgages off their books they 
could escape reserve and capital requirements. Investment banks purchased and pooled 
mortgages, then sold securities to investors. As Minsky (1987) argued, investment banks 
would pay ratings agencies to bless the securities, and hire economists to develop models 
to demonstrate that interest earnings would more than compensate for risks. Risk raters 
and economic modelers essentially served as credit enhancers, certifying that prospective 
defaults on subprimes would be little different from those on conventional mortgages—
so that the subprime-backed securities could receive the investment-grade rating required 
by insurance and pension funds.  Later, other “credit enhancements” were added to the 
securities, such as large penalties for early payment and buy-back guarantees in the event 
of capital losses due to unexpectedly high delinquencies and foreclosures—the latter 
became important when the crisis hit because the risks came right back to banks due to 
the guarantees. One other credit enhancement played an essential role—insurance on the 
securities, sold by MBIA (the world’s largest insurer), AMBAC, FGIC Corp., and CFIG. 
Without affordable insurance, and without high credit ratings for the insurers, themselves, 
the market for pools of mortgages would have been limited (Richard and Gutscher 2007). 
As soon as the crisis hit, the insurers were downgraded, which automatically led to 
downgrading of the securities—a nice vicious cycle.   
The problem is that the incentive structure was sure to create problems. In the 
aftermath of the 2000 equity market crash, investors looked for alternative sources of 
profits. Low interest rate policy by Greenspan’s Fed meant that traditional money 
markets could not offer adequate returns. Investors lusted for higher risks, and mortgage 
originators offered subprimes and other “affordability products” with ever lower   8
underwriting standards. Brokers were richly rewarded for inducing borrowers to accept 
unfavorable terms, which increased the value of the securities. New and risky types of 
mortgages—hybrid ARMs (adjustable rate mortgages) that offered low teaser rates for 
two or three years, with very high reset rates—were pushed.
2 Chairman Greenspan 
approved the practice, urging homebuyers to take on adjustable rate debt.  
As originators would not hold the mortgages, there was little reason to worry 
about ability to pay. Indeed, since banks, thrifts, and mortgage brokers relied on fee 
income, rather than interest, their incentive was to increase through-put, originating as 
many mortgages as possible. By design, the Orwellian-named “affordability products” 
were not affordable—at the time of reset, the homeowner would need to refinance, 
generating early payment penalties and more fees for originators, securitizers, holders of 
securities, and all others in the home finance food chain. The fate of homeowners was 
sealed by bankruptcy “reform” that makes it virtually impossible to get out of mortgage 
debt—another nice “credit enhancement” provided by Congress.  
The combination of incentives to increase throughput, plus credit enhancements 
led to virtually no reluctance to purchase securities with the riskiest underlying debts. 
While relationship banking had based loans on the relevant characteristics of the 
borrower (such as income, credit history, assets), the new arrangements appeared to offer 
a nearly infinite supply of impersonal mortgage credit with no need to evaluate borrower 
ability to repay. Instead, “quant models” based on historical data regarding default rates 
of purportedly similar borrowers would replace costly relationship banking, enhancing 
efficiencies and narrowing interest rate spreads (Kregel 2007). Risky mortgages were 
pooled and sliced into a variety of tranches to meet the risk-return profile desired by 
investors. Senior tranches would be paid first; more junior, non-investment grade, 
tranches could be sold to hedge funds that would receive payments only if the senior 
securities were fully serviced. (Incredibly, junior tranches could be pooled a second time, 
                                                 
2 According to an analysis of $2.5 trillion worth of subprime loans performed for the Wall Street Journal, 
most of those who obtained subprime loans would have qualified for better terms. For example, in 2006 
61% of subprime borrowers had credit scores high enough to obtain conventional loans. Because brokers 
were rewarded for persuading borrowers to take on higher interest rates than those they qualified for, there 
was strong pressure to avoid conventional loans with lower rates (Brooks and Simon 2007). This may also 
explain why brokers accepted little documentation from borrowers.   9
and even third time, and sliced into senior and junior tranches—transforming the riskiest 
junk into investment-grade senior securities.)  
In sum, by 2000, the nature of the real estate finance market had changed in a 
fundamental manner so that it would evolve toward fragility. The growth of securitization 
led to a tremendous increase of leverage ratios—typically at least 15-to-1 and often much 
greater—with the owners (for example, hedge funds) putting up very little of their own 
money while issuing potentially volatile commercial paper or other liabilities to fund 
positions in the securities.
3 A virtuous cycle was created over the course of the 1990s that 
led to the boom and subsequent bust. The economic stability encouraged financial 
innovations that “stretched liquidity” in Minsky’s terminology; this plus competition 
urged financial institutions to increase leverage ratios, increasing credit availability. This 
is because for given expected losses, higher leverage raises return on equity. With easy 
credit, asset prices could be bid up, and rising prices encouraged yet more innovation and 
competition to further increase leverage. Innovations expanded loan supply, fueled home 
buying and drove up the value of real estate, which increased the size of loans required 
and justified rising leverage ratios (loan-to-value and loan-to-income) since homes could 
always be refinanced or sold later at higher prices if problems developed. The virtuous 
cycle ensured that the financial system would move through the structures that Minsky 
labeled hedge, speculative, and finally Ponzi—which requires asset price appreciation to 
validate it. Indeed, the virtuous cycle made Ponzi position-taking nearly inevitable.  
The new “originate and distribute” model is much less subject to control by 
policy, and is also less amenable to assistance when things go bad. Instead of a closely 
regulated industry, home finance became a mostly unsupervised, highly leveraged, 
speculative activity. The Ponzi phase would end only if rates rose or prices stopped 
rising. Of course, both events were inevitable, indeed, were dynamically linked because 
Fed rate hikes would slow speculation, attenuating rising property values, and increasing 
risk spreads. When losses on subprimes began to exceed expectations based on historical 
                                                 
3 As Chancellor (2007) reports, modern risk management techniques use historical volatility as a proxy for 
risk. As volatility falls, risk is presumed to fall, which induces managers to increase leverage ratios. The 
period called “the great moderation” by Bernanke (2004) suggested that volatility would be permanently 
lower, hence, higher leverage ratios were deemed prudent. Chancellor reports that a hedge fund with only 
$10 million of own funds could leverage that up to $850 million of collateralized mortgage obligations—a 
leverage ratio of 85 to 1.   10
experience, prices of securities began to fall. Problems spread to other markets, including 
money market mutual funds and commercial paper markets, and banks became reluctant 
to lend even for short periods. With big leverage ratios, money managers faced huge 
losses greatly exceeding their capital, and began to de-leverage by selling, putting more 
downward pressure on prices. As the subprime market unraveled, fears spread to other 
asset-backed securities, including commercial real estate loans, and to other bond markets 
such as that for municipal bonds. Markets recognized that there were systemic problems 
with the credit ratings assigned by the credit ratings agencies. Further, they realized that 
if mortgage-backed securities, other asset-backed securities, and muni bonds are riskier 
than previously believed, then the insurers will have greater than expected losses. Ratings 
agencies downgraded the credit ratings of the insurers. As the financial position of 
insurers was questioned, the insurance that guaranteed the assets became worthless—so 
the ratings on bonds and securities were downgraded. In many cases, investment banks 
had a piece of this action, holding the worst of the securities, and they had promised to 
take back mortgages or had positions in the insurers—in retrospect, a huge mistake. 
         As of January 2009, U.S. financial institutions had written off $1 trillion of bad 
assets. The Treasury had injected nearly $400 billion of “bail-out” funds either through 
asset purchases, by taking non-voting equity shares, and by subsidizing mergers. The 
Fed’s balance sheet had expanded to nearly $2 trillion as it lent reserves to U.S. banks 
and to foreign central banks. Even the most conventional projections expect at least 
another $1 trillion of bank write-downs. Most observers believe many more banks will 
fail, and that Treasury costs of the bail-outs to come could be in the trillions of dollars. 
Note that the total securitized universe was only $10 trillion, of which subprimes were 
$2.5 trillion. It is clear that the losses incurred and expected to be incurred are not simply 
a matter of some bad mortgage loans made to low income borrowers to buy suburban 
mansions they could not afford. Rather, this is a crisis of the whole money manager 
system. And because so much of it is unregulated, unreported, and off-balance sheet, 
there is no way to even guess the ultimate scale of losses. 
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COMMODITIES BOOM AND BUST 
  
Over the course of the 2000s, we also saw a commodities market boom. I begin with an 
analysis of three explanations for the explosion of commodities prices. While often 
presented as rivals, I argue that simply because one explanation is valid that does not 
make the others incorrect. Indeed, there are synergies enabling the several forces driving 
prices higher to reinforce one another.  Supply and demand is the explanation provided 
by most economists. Supplies are naturally constrained while demand is climbing—
pushing prices higher. The second story involves market manipulation by commodities 
producers and traders. Finally, there is a growing belief that speculation in commodities 
futures markets is the real culprit. I argue that all three explanations are plausible and the 
identified mechanisms are mutually reinforcing. However, the rise of investments in 
commodities indexes (called “index speculation”) is the most important cause. Further, 
commodities merely represent the latest asset class identified by money manager 
capitalism as ripe for financialization. If money manager capitalism is at the root of the 
problem, then it is the system that must be changed. 
By fall 2008 commodities prices reversed course. To a large extent this seems to 
be due to the decision made by index speculators to pull out of futures markets (fearing 
that Congress will tighten regulations—and providing support to the view that the price 
boom was indeed fueled by their speculation). While this brings welcome relief it does 
not mean we are out of the woods. Falling commodity prices will generate problems: 
production decisions as well as portfolio allocations have been made on the expectation 
of rising prices, so just as falling real estate prices are devastating for households, for the 
real estate sector generally, and for financial markets, there will be significant fall-out 
from falling commodities prices. Thus, a policy response is still necessary. 
 
Supply and Demand 
Most of the press has focused on rising oil, corn, and gold prices. But in fact, the boom 
has taken place across a wide range of commodities, and indeed is unprecedented in 
scope and size. According to Frank Veneroso (2008a), over the course of the twentieth 
century, there were previously just 13 instances in which the price of a single commodity   12
rose by 500% or more. For example, the price of sugar rose 641% in 1920, and in the 
same year the price of cotton rose 538%. During the Hunt brothers episode in 1980, silver 
prices were driven up by 3813%. If we look at the current boom, there were eight 
commodities whose price rise equaled 500% or more: heating oil (1313%), nickel 
(1273%), crude oil (1205%), lead (870%), copper (606%), zinc (616%), tin (510%), and 
wheat (500%). Many other agricultural, energy, and metals commodities also had large 
price hikes, albeit below that threshold (for the 25 commodities typically included in the 
commodities indexes, the average rise since 2003 has been 203%) (Masters and White 
2008). There is no evidence of any other commodities boom to match the current one in 
terms of scope. 
We “know” from our principles of economics textbook that the cause must lie 
somewhere between the “scissors” of supply and excess demand that drives prices higher.  
While it is true that there have been supply problems associated with some of these 
commodities, none was significant enough to explain such price hikes. Thus, most of 
those favoring the supply and demand story look to the demand side, in particular, to the 
rapid development of China and India. While appealing, the story is flawed. World 
growth has not been unusually high—rapid expansion in parts of Asia is offset by 
sluggish economies in Africa and Europe. Nor has growth of oil demand been rapid 
enough to explain price hikes. While it is true that China’s demand was growing very 
rapidly early in this decade, the growth rate fell off as oil prices rose. U.S. consumption 
stabilized by mid-decade, long before oil prices peaked. Finally, although demand has 
fallen off as economies slipped into recession, actual consumption of most commodities 
has fallen only slightly—not enough to explain the rapid price deflation observed. 
Further, if markets were perfectly competitive, i.e., they contain so many buyers 
and sellers that none can influence the price, then the story provided by economists 
makes some sense. Trouble is, commodities markets—especially oil—are far from 
perfectly competitive. Many are produced in conditions of oligopoly (a few producers—
OPEC and Russia in the case of oil) and/or are sold to oligopsonists (a few buyers—
ADM and Cargill in the case of grains) who intermediate between many producers and 
final consumers. In addition, many commodities are targeted by government policy. As 
crude oil prices rose, Congress decided to subsidize on a massive scale biofuels   13
production—boosting corn and soy prices even as biofuels production increased use of 
oil (given U.S. agricultural practices, production of the crops is energy-intensive). 
Attributing these price pressures to “supply and demand” is misleading. 
 
Manipulation of Prices 
In recent years there have been several well-publicized cases of manipulation of 
commodities prices. For example, in winter 2004 British Petroleum monopolized 90% of 
all U.S. TET propane supplies, withholding enough to drive prices up. In 2007 it reached 
a court settlement, agreeing to pay $303 million in penalties and restitution (Stupak 
2007). Amaranth manipulated natural gas spot prices by driving down futures prices in 
the last 30 minutes of trading for the March, April, and May 2006 contracts, making 
profits shorting positions in the ICE (International Commodities Exchange) market 
before collapsing (ibid). Other well-known cases include the Hunt brothers manipulation 
of silver prices, the Hamanaka affair in copper, the Marc Rich and Manny Weiss 
manipulation of aluminum, and the Tiger affair in palladium (Veneroso 2008a). In any 
case, there is little doubt that manipulation has played some role. 
After crude oil prices exploded, the CFTC put together a Nationwide Crude Oil 
Investigation that culminated in charges levied against Optiver for price manipulation 
back in March 2007, finding its traders had successfully moved prices by small amounts 
to their benefit. Since 2002 the CFTC has filed 42 enforcement actions charging 72 
defendants with manipulation; in addition, the Department of Justice has filed more than 
47 criminal complaints (Veneroso 2008b; Lukken 2008).  
However, so long as the term “manipulation” is limited to the actions of 
individual traders, it cannot play a large role in the current commodities boom since the 
most important markets—oil, soy, corn, wheat—are too big to be influenced for anything 
but the shortest period. As we will discuss in the next section, it is possible that 
commodities prices have been pushed by massive inflows of managed money legally 
following a “buy and hold” strategy that is self-reinforcing precisely because it will be 
successful so long as the flows are large enough.  
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Index Speculation in Commodities Futures Markets 
After equity prices collapsed in 2000, a number of researchers demonstrated that 
commodities prices are uncorrelated with returns from fixed income instruments (for 
example, bonds) and equities (stocks). Thus, holding commodities reduces volatility of 
portfolios. Further, it was shown that commodities provide an inflation hedge. However, 
holding commodities is expensive—there are substantial storage costs. Hence, money 
managers looked to the futures market—paper claims to commodities. Because a futures 
contract would expire on the contracted date, the holder of the paper would then be in a 
position to receive the commodities. Of course, money managers do not want to ever 
receive the commodities scheduled to be delivered, so the contracts are “rolled” on the 
scheduled date—into another futures contract with a delivery date farther into the future.  
There are three main types of participants in these markets: hedgers, traditional 
speculators, and index speculators. Index speculators are typically hedge funds, pension 
funds, university endowments, life insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds, and 
banks. Most importantly, they only take long positions—it is a buy and hold strategy, 
allocating a specific portion of the portfolio to commodities. To simplify allocation, 
managed money replicates one of the commodity futures indexes—hence the term “index 
speculator.” The biggest are SP-GSCI and DJ-AIG. If index prices rise, index speculators 
earn returns. Indeed, because commodities futures contracts do not pay any yield, the 
only possible source of return is an increase of the price of the futures contracts. For this 
reason, purchase of a commodities futures index is fundamentally a speculative activity. 
Prior to the 1990s, the Prudent Investor rule prohibited pensions from buying such 
contracts (Masters and White 2008), It was the collapse of the equities market in 2000 
and the discovery that the performance of commodities was not correlated with equities 
that led to use of futures contracts to reduce portfolio risk. This is what allowed 
Goldman, Sachs & Co. as well as other indexers to successfully push commodities 
futures as a new asset class for prudent investors.  
Energy commodities dominate these indexes, with petroleum-related products 
accounting for 58%. The biggest agricultural commodities weightings are given to corn, 
soybeans, and wheat; the biggest shares for metals are in aluminum, copper, and gold. 
Typically, managed money allocates 4 or 5% of a portfolio to commodities. While this   15
might appear small, the size of managed money funds is gargantuan relative to the size of 
commodities. For comparison purposes, Masters (2008a, 2008b) pointed out that the total 
increase of Chinese consumption of oil over the past five years totaled 920 million 
barrels, while index speculators increased their holdings of oil contracts by 848 million 
barrels during the same period. As another example, index speculators hold contracts for 
over 1.3 million tons of copper, out of a total annual production of less than 18 million 
tons (Masters and White 2008, p. 18). Indeed, index speculators hold a sufficient quantity 
of wheat futures to supply America’s demand for wheat for two years, and contracts on 
enough corn to supply the US ethanol industry for a year (ibid). Masters and White 
(2008, p. 20) estimate that the total volume of futures contracts purchased in the past five 
and a half years has increased by about 5.3 million, of which index speculators bought 
2.7 million—or just over half. By contrast, physical hedgers purchased just a fifth. In 
2002 there was a total of about $50 billion of managed money in the indexes, growing 
above $100 billion in 2006 and above $300 billion at the peak (Masters 2008a). It is hard 
to avoid the conclusion that the index speculator tail is wagging the physical hedger dog. 
The case that these inflows of funds have driven commodity prices ever-higher 
seems easy to make. Figure 1 plots the spot price of the S&P GSCI index—which reflects 
the current market price of 25 basic commodities—with the flow of managed money into 
futures markets. This is because the concern is whether activity in futures markets is 
impacting today’s commodities prices.  
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The correlation is remarkable: higher money inflows lead to higher prices. 
However, as any economist will warn, correlation never proves causation. And, indeed, 
the causation must go both ways: rising prices encourage more inflows, and more inflows 
generate higher prices. But even with that caveat, the evidence appears at least 
superficially quite strong that it is a speculatively-driven run-up of commodities prices. 
The economist urges caution. Why would purchases of futures contracts drive up 
today’s spot prices? (Orthodoxy presumes the reverse: fundamentals determine spot 
prices, and expectations of future spot prices determine futures prices.) The reason is 
“price discovery.” Commodities production is often local, while final consumption is 
more geographically dispersed. For example, wheat is farmed in several distinct rural 
regions in the U.S., with ultimate consumers more than a thousand miles away. Farmers 
sell to local grain elevator owners who act as intermediaries. Neither the farmer nor the 
local grain elevator owner has much information about the price the grain might fetch 
when sold to food processors. However, unlike the local market for the physical 
commodity, the commodity futures market is national and even international. Futures   17
prices are readily available and reflect real time “supply and demand.” Thus, local 
commodities markets have come to rely on futures markets as the primary source of price 
information. There is then an adjustment made to reflect local conditions—much as 
Kelly’s Blue Book adjusts used car values to reflect local market conditions by zipcode.  
The use of commodities futures markets has eliminated the sometimes large 
differences between prices in various regional spot markets that existed prior to the 1980s 
(Masters 2008b). Now, as the CFTC describes it, “In many physical commodities 
(especially agricultural commodities), cash market participants base spot and forward 
prices on the futures prices that are ‘discovered’ in the competitive, open auction market 
of a futures exchange” (quoted in Masters 2008b). Describing oil pricing, Platts (the 
biggest pricing service for the energy industry) writes “In the spot market, therefore, 
negotiations for physical oils will typically use NYMEX as a reference point, with 
bids/offers and deals expressed as a differential to the futures price” (Platts 2007).  
Ironically, even the S&P-GSCI and the DJ-AIG “spot” price commodity indexes are 
actually “based predominantly upon the prices of the nearest-to-expiration futures 
contracts for their respective set of commodities” (Masters and White 2008, p. 8). 
Finally, Masters emphasizes the point: “In the present system, price changes for key 
agricultural and energy commodities originate in the futures markets and then are 
transmitted directly to the spot markets”  (Masters 2008b, emphasis in original). 
In summary, index speculators have driven prices for commodities to historic 
levels. Commodities markets deviate substantially from the textbook models, with prices 
that are administered rather than set by fundamental forces of supply and demand. In 
many cases, spot prices are determined directly by futures prices. Futures prices, in turn, 
are influenced by a variety of forces including attempts by buyers and sellers to hedge 
price risk, by traditional speculators to go short or long as they make guesses about price 
movements, and by index speculators diversifying portfolios into a new asset class—
commodities. It is no coincidence that futures prices soared over the past four years as 
managed money flowed into markets—coming from pension funds, sovereign wealth 
funds, hedge funds, and banks (mostly European). This reinforced other factors that had 
been driving up prices, including rapid growth in China and India as well as some supply 
constraints and inventory manipulation. Government policies, including export   18
restrictions and U.S. biofuels incentives, also played a role. These policy choices were 
themselves prodded by rising commodities prices, even as they contributed to rising 
prices. A perfect storm was created in which almost every participant’s interest lay in 
continued price gains.  
Once managed money achieved the desired allocation of commodities, the large 
volumes of inflows subsided. Further, when Congress began to investigate the role of 
managed money in commodities markets, pension funds retreated fearing bad publicity 
and possible regulation. Suddenly prices stopped rising. Traditional speculators revised 
their expectations and some began to short commodities. A strong price reversal took 
place between mid-July, when the price of oil brushed up against $150 a barrel, and mid-
August, when it had dropped below $115. (By January 2009 the price had plummeted 
toward $40; it is estimated that one-third of all the managed money had fled the market 
by fall 2008.) Producers who had made business plans based on rising prices find that 
they cannot succeed in an environment of falling commodities prices. We have seen the 
result of falling agricultural commodities prices several times during the past century; of 
course the most significant was during the period described in The Grapes of Wrath. The 
consequences for rural America and its banks can be severe. Farmers in rural areas 
around the globe are already feeling the pinch. While starvation hit urban areas in the 




Let us first deal with the commodities market crisis because that appears simplest to 
resolve. Much of the managed money engaged in index speculation benefits from explicit 
or implicit government guarantees (such as the insurance that stands behind pensions) 
and from tax benefits (tax-advantaged savings). If Congress should find that public 
interest is threatened by index speculation, then it should prohibit commodity index 
replication strategies. Masters and White (2008) have argued for revision of the Prudent 
Investor rule to explicitly prohibit pension investment in commodities. Alternatively, they 
note that if all profits from speculation in commodities were subject to tax, it would 
severely reduce the attractiveness of these markets for tax-advantaged savings. While it is   19
beyond the scope of this paper, it is also necessary to close the various loopholes that 
allow commodities speculation to escape regulation and oversight. 
Assuming the commodities market boom is coming to an ugly end, Congress also 
needs to consider what can be done to cushion the collapse. Those holding futures 
contracts that cannot be rolled without catastrophic losses include pension funds, banks, 
and hedge funds. Further, to the extent that futures prices affect spot prices, producers of 
agricultural commodities are now finding that market prices won’t cover costs incurred. 
Already tight global food supplies will be restricted further if farmers react the way they 
usually do to falling prices: by destroying crops and slaughtering animals. Alternative 
energy suppliers will be hurt by falling crude oil prices. To help relieve distress, Congress 
needs to ramp-up global food aid this year, purchasing agricultural output to help U.S. 
farmers facing falling prices, to be distributed to the world’s hungry. American 
producers—especially of alternative energy—also need to be protected from falling 
commodities prices. More subsidies for wind, solar, and geothermal energy will be 
needed. 
More generally, the commodities market bubble (and coming crash) is the third 
such episode in the past decade that resulted from unfettered, lemming-like herding of 
money over the cliff. To be sure, there have been many earlier examples—muni bonds in 
the 1960s, commercial paper in the late 1960s, REITs in the early 1970s, commercial real 
estate and LBOs in the 1980s, and so on. The problem is that managed money has grown 
tremendously, and leverage ratios have risen as taste for risk grew even as ability to 
perceive risk became ever scarcer. (Minsky used to attribute this to fading memories of 
the Great Depression; many of today’s money managers cannot even remember the 
1980s—much less the 1930s.) As a result, we have—we might say—command over too 
much money chasing too few good asset classes with what are perceived to be acceptable 
returns.  
The U.S. (and global) financial sector continues to reel from the crisis that began 
with subprime mortgages; falling commodities prices will only make that very much 
worse. Pension funds will be threatened, depleting the Pension Benefit Guarantee 
Corporation. The FDIC’s “insurance” fund is already insolvent on any honest accounting 
basis. A lot of bail-out funds have already been spent in the U.S. and abroad, and more   20
will be spent. Still, if a lot of wealth is not wiped out, there will be tremendous pressure 
on money managers to find yet another asset class ripe with possibilities for lofty returns. 
Without greater oversight, the “cure” could be worse than the disease. So bail-outs will 
be needed, but strings must be attached in the form of regulatory constraint to prevent 
another boom/bust cycle. 
Time and economic growth can go a long way in restoring financial health—if 
incomes can grow sufficiently, it becomes easier to service debt. The private sector 
cannot be the main source of demand stimulus as it has been running up debt, spending 
more than its income for a decade. While the government budget deficit is already 
growing as the economy slows, this results from deterioration of employment and income 
(which lowers taxes and increases transfers)—thus it will not proactively create growth 
although it will help to constrain the depths of recession. What is needed is a massive 
fiscal stimulus—probably twice the $800 billion that the Obama team will propose—and 
then a permanently larger fiscal presence to allow growth without relying on private 
sector debt. 
We will also have to have mortgage relief. President Roosevelt created an RFC-
like agency, the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC), to take on the tasks of saving 
small home owners. This successfully refinanced 20% of the nation’s mortgages, issuing 
bonds to raise the funds. While a fifth of those loans eventually were foreclosed, the 
HOLC actually managed to earn a small surplus on its activities, which was paid to the 
Treasury when it was liquidated in 1951. Clearly, there are lessons to be learned from 
that experience: refinance is preferable to foreclosure as it preserves homeownership and 
communities. Congress must promulgate regulations on mortgage originators to establish 
new licensing requirements, put restrictions on saddling borrowers with riskier loans, and 
provide liability for financial institutions that sell mortgages. In addition, Congress 
should set new standards to be met by originators regarding ability of borrowers to make 
payments. New regulations of appraisers, risk rating agencies, and accounting firms will 
be required. 
Policy should avoid promotion of financial institution consolidation—a natural 
result of financial crises that can be boosted by policy-arranged bailouts. Minsky always 
preferred policy that would promote small-to-medium sized financial institutions.   21
Unfortunately, policy-makers who are biased toward “free markets” instinctively prefer 
to use public money to subsidize private institution takeovers of failing financial firms. 
The Roosevelt alternative should be adopted: temporary “nationalization” of failing 
institutions with a view to eventually return them to the private sector at a small profit to 
the U.S. Treasury. This is what Minsky advocated during the thrift crisis of the 1980s, but 
President Bush, senior, chose industry consolidation and public assumption of bad assets 
that resulted in Treasury losses—bad policy repeated by Bush, junior’s Treasury 
Secretary Paulson. Policy should instead foster competition, with a bias against 
consolidation and with greater regulation of the banking, protected, sector. 
Minsky argued that the Great Depression represented a failure of the small-
government, Laissez-faire economic model, while the New Deal promoted a Big 
Government/Big Bank highly successful model for financial capitalism. The current 
crisis just as convincingly represents a failure of the Big Government/Neoconservative 
(or, outside the U.S., what is called neo-liberal) model that promotes deregulation, 
reduced supervision and oversight, privatization, and consolidation of market power. It 
replaced the New Deal reforms with self-supervision of markets, with greater reliance on 
“personal responsibility” as safety nets were shredded, and with monetary and fiscal 
policy that is biased against maintenance of full employment and adequate growth to 
generate rising living standards for most Americans. The model is in trouble—and not 
just with respect to the current global crisis, as the US faces record inequality and 
destruction of the middle class, a healthcare crisis, an incarceration disaster, and other 
problems beyond the scope of this analysis (See Wray 2005 and Wray 2000). 
We must return to a more sensible model, with enhanced oversight of financial 
institutions and with a financial structure that promotes stability rather than speculation. 
We need policy that promotes rising wages for the bottom half so that borrowing is less 
necessary to achieve middle class living standards. We need policy that promotes 
employment, rather than transfer payments—or worse, incarceration—for those left 
behind. Monetary policy must be turned away from using rate hikes to pre-empt inflation 
and toward a proper role: stabilizing interest rates, direct credit controls to prevent 
runaway speculation, and supervision.  
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Minsky insisted “the creation of new economic institutions which constrain the 
impact of uncertainty is necessary,” arguing that the “aim of policy is to assure that the 
economic prerequisites for sustaining the civil and civilized standards of an open liberal 
society exist. If amplified uncertainty and extremes in income maldistribution and social 
inequalities attenuate the economic underpinnings of democracy, then the market 
behavior that creates these conditions has to be constrained” (Minsky 1996, pp 14, 15). It 
is time to take finance back from the clutches of Wall Street’s casino. 
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